This article examines the effects of transaction costs on the choice of marketing channel by smallholder banana producers (i.e. travel to the market to sell their produce versus selling at the farmgate). A probit analysis is used to identify the factors which determine the choice of a selling point. Variables capturing transaction costs are used in the analysis and these relate to searching for a trading partner, gathering information about the transaction, contracting, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing of contracts. The findings reveal that collective action, gender of household head, degree of dependence on the crop, geographical location and access to price information significantly affect the choice of selling point. This suggests that policies aimed at establishing market information systems, promotion of collective action among smallholder farmers, increased investment in rural infrastructure and achieving gender balance in trade are important.
The choice of selling point is mainly determined by factors associated with trading partner, making and enforcing contracts (Delgado, 1999; Holloway et al., 2000) . Transaction costs can be broadly categorised into (i) information and search costs; (ii) negotiation and contracting; and (iii) monitoring and enforcement costs. product, price offers, delivery mode, terms of payment and, possibly, frequency of repeat transactions. The second category involves building consensus on the price, quantity, quality, terms of payment and mode of delivery. The third category involves making sure that what has been agreed upon in the contract is adhered to.
Nonetheless, transactions do take place when producers deal directly with consumers or indirectly through intermediaries, that is, economic agents who specialise in the activities of buying and selling the same products, commonly referred to as middlemen. The existence of friction in trade gives rise to the function of intermediation. Middlemen play the role of mediating between the seller of a product and its potential buyers. In instances where transactions are direct (i.e. without involving middlemen), the seller and buyer share the trade surplus. However, in instances where middlemen negotiate the trade, the middlemen share the surplus with the sellers and buyers. Economic literature rationalises the intermediation by arguing that intermediaries economise on the cost of transactions and information asymmetries (Chowdhury, 2002) .
Though neo-classical economists essentially assume that information is perfect and costless, this assumption does not comply with reality, especially with a cost which generates a wedge between the buying and selling prices. One of the fundamental sources of transaction costs affecting both the smallholder farmers and intermediaries is the cost of obtaining information (Shepherd, 1997) . Since information is neither perfect nor costless, this has important implications for contracts and transactions. This was pointed out by Coase (1937) and later expanded in Coase (1960) , emphasising that market exchange is not costless. In developing countries, economic agents overcome the information problems arrangements and institutions. The existence of intermediaries can, therefore, be viewed as one of the arrangements to overcome the problems of transaction costs and imperfect or costly information.
However, farmers often view middlemen as exploiters who offer them low prices and sell their products to buyers at higher prices, thereby bagging huge margins. Farmers have, therefore, made attempts to bypass middlemen and sell directly to buyers at the end of the supply chain, but this involves costs which are not anticipated by farmers. Middlemen have over time gained expertise in minimising transaction costs and, hence, there is a continuous debate about the gains and losses of selling through middlemen or directly.
Several studies have dwelt on empirically explaining the existence of middlemen in the context of developing countries by estimating their margins on each transaction. However, little attention has been accorded to explaining the middlemen. Chowdhury (2002) assessed the impact of information cost and other transaction costs on rural producers of non-staples such as eggs, milk and chicken in Bangladesh. Nonetheless, the story could be different when handling a staple such as bananas, which, despite being highly perishable, are widely produced, sold and consumed in the Great Lakes region of Africa where transaction costs are high due to the weak physical and telecommunication infrastructure.
decisions of farmers on which channels to use when selling their products while taking into consideration the nature and economic importance of the product itself. The study aims at suggesting policy recommendations that will enhance the marketing of bananas in the Great Lakes region.
The rest of the article contains sections covering the crop in focus, the conceptual framework, the theoretical framework, the variables used and the results of the study. The article concludes with a summary of the key observations and policy recommendations. 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Market participation not only implies travelling to the market, but includes selling output at the farmgate as well. Traders are, therefore, important partners to the farmers in the marketing of agricultural produce, especially where infrastructure is weak (Watanabe, 2006) . Participation in the markets by smallholder farmers and traders is affected by government policies relating to infrastructure development, external factors such as political stability of the nation, natural disasters and calamities also affect market participation. These factors could have positive or negative effects, which could either improve or cause a decline in the welfare of the actors. The point of departure is that greater market participation of farmers and traders results in more commodities being traded and this may lead to more revenue being obtained by the actors. In the case of farmers, this becomes an incentive to increase production and, hence, a positive supply response is achieved.
promoting agricultural growth in sub Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2005; World Development Report, 2008) . The premise behind this framework is that markets turn, stimulate agricultural growth and hence, reduce poverty. Building effective markets requires a supportive policy environment which ensures improvement of infrastructure, communications and removal of barriers which hamper growth of agri-businesses. The World Development Report (2008) emphasises that reducing transaction costs and risks in the marketing of food staples can promote faster 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this article, we postulate that banana producers make a discrete choice whether to sell at the farmgate or travel to the market. This decision is based on the margins obtainable while taking into consideration the costs involved. We assume that P prd margin, and P mkt is the average price at which the bananas would be sold if the farmer travelled to the market, while P fg is the price at which the bananas would be sold if the farmer sold to intermediaries at the farmgate. TC fg and TC mkt are transaction costs of selling bananas at the farmgate and the market, respectively. Three scenarios (equations 1 to 3) are likely to guide the choice of a selling
Equation [1] suggests that farmers would opt to travel to the market to sell, while equation [2] suggests that farmers would opt to sell at the farmgate. Equation [3] suggests that farmers would be indifferent between travelling to the market and selling at the farmgate. The choice of selling point Y is, therefore, a function of the price offered at the market, the price offered at the farmgate, the respective transaction costs incurred, and other factors such as the institutional environment represented by Z. This function is thus represented in equation [4] :
We further postulate that scenario 3 may collapse into the other two scenarios, hence creating a situation where a discrete choice of the selling point has to be made. We adopt the situation that Y = 1 represents scenario 1, where travelling to the market to sell is opted for, while Y = 0 represents scenario 2, where selling at the farmgate is opted for.
as shown in equation [5] :
where Y* is a latent variable that is unobserved. The dummy variable Y is what is [6] Furthermore, 1 represents parameter estimates for the variables capturing the transaction costs and 2 represents parameter estimates for variables capturing the other factors affecting the choice of a selling point (e.g., variables capturing the institutional environment).
The likelihood functions of this model are therefore written as: [7] [8]
The marginal effects of this model are expressed as: or (b) sell the commodity at the farmgate, respectively. The independent variables range from those capturing transaction costs to those capturing the institutional environment within which the farmers operate. The variables capturing transaction costs include distances to the nearest market place and health centres, access to market information, membership of a market oriented group, and possession of means of transport. The variables capturing other factors affecting choice of a selling point include commodity price differences, degree of dependence on household head, access to credit, and asset holdings of the household. Table 1 presents a description of the variable names and their summary statistics. The variable HHSELLINGMKT is the dependent variable which takes the values mostly sell their produce at the farmgate, respectively. The independent variables capturing transaction costs include those relating to searching for trading partners and gathering of information about buyers and prices. Among these are the variables FGRPMEMBSHP and COLLCTVMKTGRP, which capture the involvement of household members in groups where information relating to selling their produce might be accessed. Negative signs are expected for the estimates of both of these variables because involvement in collective action is expected to assume a joint responsibility in marketing, which then relieves farmers from travelling to the market to sell their produce on an individual basis. These variables also capture the aspects of negotiating and contracting since a common voice tends to be more powerful than individual voices. Other variables related variables on the basis that the greater the lack of information, the less likely it will be for farmers to travel to the market to sell their produce for fear of making losses. Ownership of means of transport and access to media are crucial in gathering information, hence the variables BICYCLE and RADIO are included in the model. Positive signs are expected for the estimates of these variables (Chowdhury, 2002) .
Considering the aspect of negotiation and contracting, variables capturing used. These include BANAPROPSOLD which captures the dependence of the household on the commodity. A positive sign would imply that households are less dependent on the commodity in terms of food for domestic consumption and, therefore, would be willing to sell much of it. The willingness to sell affects the gender concerns and EDUCATION are based on the assumption that maleheaded households and households headed by more educated people are better empowered to travel to the market and negotiate for better prices, hence positive signs are expected a priori. With regard to the monitoring and enforcement of contracts, variables such as MKTDISTANCE and HOSPDISTANCE do capture the degree of remoteness of the households which, in turn, has an implication on the monitoring and enforcement of contracts.
Other variables capturing the other factors that may have a direct or indirect HHSIZE, CREDITUSE, OFFFARMREV and BANAPRODN. These capture the
The expected signs for the estimates of these variables are ambiguous since they are not directly linked to transaction costs. Table 2 shows the comparative statistics for households categorised by selling point. The two independent samples t-test was conducted on the continuous variables of the two categories of households (i.e., those mainly selling at the market and those mainly selling at the farmgate). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was performed for variables that were not normally distributed. The null hypothesis tested was households. Table 2 shows a comparison between the farmers whose main selling point is the market and those who mainly sell their produce at the farmgate. The average land holding of farmers who mainly sell their produce at the market is much lower than the average landholdings of those farmers who mainly sell their produce at the farmgate (i.e. 2.87 ha and 7.47 ha, respectively). This observation may imply that resource poor farmers are more obliged to travel to the market to sell their produce as opposed to staying home and waiting for buyers. This result is similar to what Fafchamps and Hill (2005) observed when looking at coffee marketing in Uganda whereby wealthier farmers were less likely to sell at the market.
THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
prices of cooking bananas for the two household categories. This observation is very critical and may imply that households which commonly travel to the market do sell their commodities at much higher prices as compared to those which commonly sell at the farmgate. selling prices of beer bananas for the two household categories. This observation the market do sell their commodities at much higher prices as compared to those which commonly sell at the farmgate.
The rest of the variables whose mean values were compared for the two p < 0.05 level. The sample is then further treated to a probit analysis to further establish the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The results of the probit analysis are shown in table 3 and the discussion focuses on the variables which directly capture the effects of transaction costs on the discrete decision to sell at the market versus selling at the farmgate.
In regard to gathering information about prices offered coupled with searching for potential trading partners, belonging to a farmer group or a collective marketing group decreases the probability of a household selling their produce directly at the who belong to farming groups or marketing groups do sell their produce under such arrangements and hence they travel less to the market.
for the variables capturing sources of price information. Having absolutely no access to price information reduces the probability of a household selling their produce at the market. Intuitively, households very remotely located and with no access to price information whatsoever are less likely to travel to the market to sell their produce. They can only sell to those who manage to get to them. In such instances, farmers are likely to be more of price takers than price makers, especially when the commodity handled is highly perishable.
price information from neighbours implies that a situation where households only mainly access price information from village mates and neighbours reduces their chances of travelling to the market to sell their produce. A similar observation is made for those households mainly accessing price information from traders. The explanation for these observations is that households which do not have easy access to the market are prone to only obtaining information from neighbours, village mates and traders. In such a case, information may be distorted to the advantage of the other party, thereby discouraging farmers from endeavouring to travel to the market to sell their produce.
In terms of negotiations and contracting, the positive and statistically household head to be male and more advanced in age increases the probability of the household selling its produce at the market. This can be attributed to their ability to engage in negotiations and their experience in trade both of which are positively linked to age and gender. The dependence on the product which is captured by OFFFARMREV and marginal effects observed for the OFFFARMREV variable implies that the less the off-farm revenue, the higher the probability of selling produce at the market. Intuitively, households which are more dependent on farming endeavour to travel to the market in search for better prices. Similar observations were made by Chowdhury (2002) when looking at farmers in Bangladesh. In regard to monitoring of the contracts and enforcement, variables such as MKTDISTANCE and HOSPDISTANCE were included in the analysis. The that the more remotely located a household is, the greater the probability that urgent need for cash revenue outweighs the opportunity cost of time especially for remotely placed households such that the members are willing to travel long distances to gain this revenue. This implication may be counter intuitive to the earlier observations by Fafchamps and Hill (2005) that shorter distances would favour the monitoring and enforcement of contracts, hence encouraging farmers to travel to the market.
to the market to sell their produce. This could be attributed to the availability of household members to embark on the task which is relatively time consuming. Households with fewer members may incur a higher opportunity cost of their labour time.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
and gathering information about price offers, terms of payment, quality and quantity requirements of the buyers. This study has captured these aspects through a set of variables which relate to the transaction costs. In regard to information access, the establishment of a market information system which provides timely and reliable information on prices, potential buyers and terms or conditions of purchase is highly recommended for the study area. Such systems have been established in the neighbouring Uganda and have registered remarkable improvement in information access by smallholder producers. Improved access to information empowers the smallholder farmers with knowledge and enables them to gain a better bargaining position, which in turn shields them from being exploited by intermediaries.
Collective action in farming and marketing activities should be supported and promoted in order to reduce transaction costs mainly associated with contracting and negotiating processes. Farming and marketing groups are able to assist farmers enforcing the contracts made. The smallholder farmers when working jointly reduce the transaction costs immensely and may save a lot of time which they could have spent while working in isolation.
Policies which support increased investment in rural infrastructure should be developed. Rural infrastructure may refer to roads, electricity, telecommunication and market places. These play a crucial role in the exchange of goods and services. as contract enforcement.
at supporting and protecting the vulnerable groups, especially female headed households, should be developed and implemented.
